

Approved For Release 2002/05/23 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070001-1

BACKGROUND PAPERIntelligence Support for the Sinai Support Mission (SSM)Basic Authority

- On 15 September 1975 NSSM 230 directed that a study be conducted regarding the establishment of the SSM and should analyze how best to organize and supervise its activities (TAB A).
- On 31 October 1975 the response to NSSM 230 was submitted outlining the SSM's purposes, concept of operations, legal authority and funding, assignment of agency responsibility, and providing various recommendations (TAB B).
- On 14 November 1975 NSDM 313 was issued (TAB C) which directed that:
 - a senior interagency group (State, DoD, CIA, AID, ACDA) be established under the auspices of the NSC to organize, coordinate and provide overall management for the Mission.
 - the Mission be headed by a Director who will receive broad policy guidance and report to the President through LTG Scowcroft.
 - in the field, the major part of the work will be carried out under private contract.
 - the Mission would be established expeditiously and that a comprehensive review of all its operations be made one year hence.

Essential Purposes of SSM

- verifying the operations of the Israeli and Egyptian surveillance sites.
- the establishment and operation of three watch stations and a number of unmanned electronic sensor fields.
- reporting any divergence from the agreed use of the surveillance sites and/or movement of armed forces of either side into the passes.
- performing these tasks in such a manner as to strengthen the Basic Agreement between Egypt and Israel.

State Dept., NSC reviews completed

Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
 Automatically Downgraded at Two
 Year Intervals and Declassified
 on December 31, 1983

Approved For Release 2002/05/23 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001800070001-1

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Concept of SSM Operation

- The SSM will be an autonomous organization which will discharge the surveillance responsibilities assigned to the U.S. civilians under the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the related U.S. proposal approved by Congress.
- The Director, Sinai Field Mission, is Nick Thorne. He will serve in the Sinai. The Washington Staff will be headed by C. William Kontos of State.
- It will be a civilian organization whose total, regularly employed personnel will not exceed 200 persons. It will draw upon all Washington agencies for support, but the major part of its operational and logistic functions will be carried out by private contractors.
- The headquarters and base camp for U.S. civilian personnel will be located in the area of the Early Warning System.
- In the field, the organization will work closely with the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance site commanders and with UNEF.
- The equipment to be operated will be sensor systems, basically of limited range, acoustical intrusion type.

Intelligence Community Staff Role

The ICS will undertake a supportive role, providing State with assistance through the interagency group. Currently, the IC Staff is involved in:

- Assisting INR to develop a daily intelligence summary (see TAB D) which would be sent to the Sinai Field Mission containing: general highlights of Middle East activity, status of Israeli and opposing Arab forces, key events, terrorist activity and UN deliberations. (PRD awaiting State working paper.)
- Proposing a set of alert procedures based on the NOIWON system for proper warning notification of events that would directly affect the safety of the Sinai Field Mission. (PRD has the action.)

FOUR ATTACHMENTS

- TAB A - NSSM 230
- TAB B - Response to NSSM 230
- TAB C - NSDM 313
- TAB D - Memo (State/12 Jan 76) Intelligence Support for the Sinai Field Mission

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Executive Registry

75-11,384

SECRET (GDS)

September 15, 1975


National Security Study Memorandum 230

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Establishment of U.S. Sinai Support Mission

The President has directed that a study be conducted regarding the establishment of a U.S. Sinai Support Mission pursuant to the U.S. Proposal of September 1, 1975, submitted in connection with the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of the same date. The study should analyze how best to organize and supervise the activities of a Sinai Support Mission and should develop appropriate recommendations for effecting the provisions of the Proposal.

The study should be carried out by an ad hoc group comprised of representatives of the addressees and chaired by the representative of the Department of State. The study should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs not later than September 22, 1975, for consideration by the President.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRET (GDS)

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

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B

RESPONSE TO NSSM 230

ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION

October 31, 1975

Subject to GDS OF E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.

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PURPOSES

1. The purposes of the U.S. Sinai Support Mission shall include:

--verifying the nature of the operations of the one Israeli and the one Egyptian early warning surveillance site permitted under the Basic Agreement, as well as all movement into and out of these two sites;

--establishing and operating three Watch Stations in the Mitla and Giddi passes and, in support of these stations, four unmanned electronic sensor fields at the ends of each pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from these stations;

--reporting to the USG or elsewhere as authorized or directed on the basis of the verification and early warning functions described in the preceding paragraphs respectively, (a) any divergence from the authorized uses of the Parties' sites, and (b) any movement of armed forces, other than those of UNEF, into either pass or any observed preparation for such movement;

--performing the foregoing functions in accordance with all the provisions of the Basic Agreement, and in such fashion as to inspire confidence in the Parties that the U.S. role in the Early Warning system will strengthen the Basic Agreement.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

2. The U.S. Sinai Support Mission will be a civilian organization whose total, regularly employed personnel will not exceed 200 persons. Within this total, there will be about 125 civilian personnel actually present in the Sinai at any one time. It will draw upon all Washington agencies for support, but the major part of its operational and logistic functions will be carried out by private contractors.
3. The Mission will be headed by a director with a small staff in Washington, and supported by a management board of senior officers drawn from involved Government agencies who will meet regularly to coordinate and assist in the activities of the Mission.

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4. The Sinai Support Mission shall establish procedures for carrying out the duties and responsibilities described above under "Purposes" with the approval of and in cooperation with appropriate USG agencies. In the field, the organization would work closely with the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance site commanders and with UNEF. The field mission in the Sinai would be under the direction of Government officials but almost completely staffed by civilian personnel contracted from the private sector. The headquarters and base camp for the U.S. civilian personnel will be located in the area of the Early Warning System, at a location to be agreed upon with appropriate Egyptian and Israeli authorities and UNEF.
5. The Washington staff will draw up, award and supervise the contracts needed to supply the Sinai operation in logistics, personnel, equipment, etc. It will also ensure the proper interagency coordination of reporting from and instructions to the field. State, CIA and DOD should receive the intelligence reports from the Mission. Neither the Washington office nor the field organization would assume any of the normal functions of existing government agencies, such as diplomatic representation, intelligence analysis, and policy formulation. It should be formally placed under the NSC for reasons of effectiveness in coordinating the contributions and activities of agencies.
6. In order to meet the February deployment deadline, the Sinai Support Mission must maintain a tight schedule. By early November, the Washington office should be organized under the Mission Director and a field director selected. The site survey must be completed in November and the advance party and construction teams in place in December (Tab A - timetable).

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND FUNDING

7. Legal authority for the establishment, operation and maintenance of the Sinai Support Mission is derived from Section 531 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA). This broad authority to provide economic assistance "to promote or support economic or political stability" is also used as the basis for existing U.S. economic assistance programs for Egypt and Israel. This authority would be supplemented by that in Section 631 which permits the assignment of personnel abroad to carry out the purposes of the FAA.

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8. Ample funds are available under the present FY 1976 continuing resolution to finance the initial costs of the Sinai Support Mission (Tab D - Estimated Budget). Funds for FY 1976 are included in the new budget request.
9. Use of FAA authority and funding for the Sinai Support Mission provides a very flexible array of statutory powers. Under the FAA, the President can allocate funds and delegate authority to any U.S. agency and such agency can spend the funds so allocated in accordance with its own administrative and operating authorities or those contained in the FAA. Accordingly, any agency chosen to manage the program, or to perform operational tasks, will have sufficient legal authorities and funds to carry out its responsibilities.

ASSIGNMENT OF AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY

10. The principal criteria in selecting an executive agent or a managing agent are the ability to marshal the necessary resources and its political acceptability to the parties and the Congress. A single agency could be chosen to manage the operation or the task could be given to an inter-agency management group. In either case, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development will be tasked for assistance. (See Tabs B and C--alternative organization charts.)
11. A single agency as manager would provide clear lines of authority, thereby contributing to efficiency and responsiveness to management and political concerns. The advantages of an inter-agency management group would be that it would facilitate inter-agency cooperation. Whether single agency or inter-agency, the manager would receive policy direction and guidance from the appropriately mandated offices in the Department of State and technical support from the DCI. The options are:

- I. Single Executive Agent

- A. Director of Central Intelligence: The Director of Central Intelligence would be tasked as the executive agent to carry out the USG responsibilities in the Sinai. The DCI would serve in his role as Presidential intelligence advisor and coordinator of the Intelligence Community to develop an inter-agency organization to meet these responsibilities.

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--Pros: This choice is consonant with one concept of the mission, which is that the USG is to assume the custody of sensitive early warning systems and functions in Egypt and Israel. Custody would be entrusted to knowledgeable professionals. The CIA already has a support structure in the U. S. and abroad with operating logistics, personnel, and communications functions. Interagency cooperation would be accommodated by the DCI acting in his community role; he would call upon CIA as only one part of a multi-agency effort.

--Cons: Designating the DCI also has important limitations. Given the present climate of public and Congressional opinion in the United States and likely Arab and Soviet criticism, this move would complicate our public and diplomatic problems, expose Sadat to still more extreme attack, and would be unacceptable to some members of Congress. To some observers, it would appear that the real purpose of U.S. civilian participation was the collection of intelligence.

B. State: State, which has been so deeply involved in the negotiations, has an important stake in the success of the Sinai operation. It is another logical choice for a purely civilian agency of control. Under whatever form of management State would provide policy direction to the Sinai Mission.

--Pros: State has at its disposition some of the types of personnel required for the operation, especially at program management levels. The choice of State should be politically acceptable to Congress.

--Cons: The principal disadvantage of selecting State as the agency solely responsible for the Sinai Mission lies in the increased burden that would be placed on the Department's support, logistical, and early warning systems. However, this burden would be alleviated in part by the maximum effective use of commercial contracts, which is intended in any case.

C. AID: With the Foreign Assistance Act as the preferred vehicle for funding, there is an argument in favor of tying responsibility for the budget to responsibility for headquarters and field operations.

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--Pros: AID has substantial field and logistics experience and is organized to deal with private contractors. The selection of AID as the responsible agency might defuse some of the Congressional criticism.

--Cons: AID has no political mandate or experience with early warning systems and would feel distinctly uncomfortable with an assignment like that foreseen for the Sinai Mission. Congress might be equally uncomfortable with the selection of an Agency whose principal responsibilities lie in the field of development and humanitarian assistance. AID would have difficulty in establishing an effective working relationship for this purpose with other USG agencies on the one hand, and UNEF on the other.

D. ACDA: The Disarmament Agency offers another management resource for the Sinai Support Mission.

--Pros: ACDA responsibility would give the Sinai Mission good political color--the peacekeeping purpose of ACDA should appeal to Congress and the public.

--Cons: The Disarmament Agency system is not equipped or experienced in setting up and maintaining a large, independent, overseas mission. The Agency has only limited Middle Eastern expertise. It would have to recruit or borrow almost all the personnel to staff both program management and technical positions, though the latter may be available from private contractors.

II. An Inter-Agency Management Arrangement

As in the Indochina refugee program, the Sinai Support Mission could be created on an interagency basis to run the Washington office in such a way as to organize, coordinate and manage the services of those Washington agencies best equipped to support particular functions, as well as private contractors. A single agency would be given lead responsibility as State was when the Inter-agency Task Force for Indochina was first organized. With regard to the present program, State would be a logical candidate. The Director of the Sinai Support Mission--who would also chair the Inter-agency Management Staff--would receive broad guidance from, and report directly to, the Assistant to the President for National Security

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Affairs and the Secretary of State. The Director would be assisted by a staff drawn from different agencies and a deputy with a strong management background. He would be responsible for testifying before Congress. The staff would identify legal, Congressional liaison, press, budget, personnel, operational and logistical services in the appropriate departments of the Government and make arrangements for their support of the Sinai Mission.

The Director would be assisted moreover by a Management Board of officers at senior policy level in involved Government agencies who on behalf of their agency heads would be responsible for overseeing and ensuring their agencies' contributions to the program. The Management Board will be advisory and responsive to the requirements of the Director of the Sinai Support Mission. The Management Board would meet regularly with the Director and help him coordinate the Sinai Mission's work with parent agencies. Creating an inter-agency management staff to see the Sinai Mission through its formative stage would not preclude assignment of the responsibility to a single agency at a later date.

--Pros: An interagency staff and management board would facilitate coordination in Washington and would have the advantage of permitting its director and lead agency to assemble the best talent from all agencies in Washington. The concept of an inter-agency group responsible to the President through the NSC should be politically acceptable on the Hill and with the Israelis and Arabs.

--Cons: The concept suffers from the fact that agency responsibilities would be less clear and over time maintaining agency commitments of personnel and resources would be more difficult. Efficiency might suffer under the arrangement and it could become a less sensitive and responsible management tool than we require.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Of the two broad management alternatives described above--the Single Executive Agent, and the Inter-agency Management Arrangement--the Departments of State and Defense, the Agency for International Development, ACDA, and the DCI have agreed the latter approach would produce

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satisfactory results. OMB does not agree and prefers a single agency responsibility. With the exception of OMB, the other agencies believe that an inter-agency program should be established. This approach should be acceptable to both the Congress and the public, and would cause few political problems with Egypt and Israel. At the same time, an NSC-sponsored inter-agency program, with its director representing the President, would have the advantage of being able to call more readily upon those agencies of government most qualified to deliver needed skills and support, and contract for assistance from private firms as necessary.

The Departments of State, Defense, AID, ACDA, and the DCI therefore recommend that you approve, under the aegis and lead of the Department of State, the establishment of an interagency management board to organize, coordinate and manage the Sinai Support Mission.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2. OMB recommends against the Interagency Management arrangement. OMB strongly prefers a Single Executive Agent in order to assure clear lines of authority and to maximize management efficiency and political responsiveness. OMB also believes that Secretary Kissinger should exercise line authority over the Mission as Secretary of State rather than as Assistant to the President for several reasons:

--An Inter-agency Task Force approach is most suitable for short-term crisis-management situations with many agencies' operations to be coordinated; the Sinai management problem is perceived as operating through a single Mission organization and for an indefinite duration.

--The National Security Council would not normally meet to oversee operational matters and the NSC staff is too small to provide effective direction.

--The Secretary of State can directly task the whole apparatus of the Department of State and is likely to rely heavily on Department officials for guidance to the Director of the Sinai Support Mission.

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Approve the Department of State
as single executive agent _____

Disapprove _____

3. The Director would receive broad policy direction from and report to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or the Secretary of State (depending on the option selected) and would receive political advice from the Department of State. He would be assisted by a small staff in Washington, as well as the interagency management board. He would designate representatives in the field to oversee the operational and logistical functioning of the Mission, but the major part of the work would be carried out by private contract personnel, who would be responsible to the Director and his representatives.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

4. In order to enhance the Director's ability to work successfully within the U. S. Government and with the Israelis, Egyptians and the United Nations Emergency Force, the Director of the U. S. Sinai Support Mission should carry the additional title of Special Representative of the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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Planning Schedule for the U.S. Sinai Support Mission

	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN
Brief Executive and Legislative on concept			X		
Establish the Sinai office in Washington			X		
Brief UN New York on concept			X		
Select key personnel for the Sinai Mission			X		
Brief Egypt and Israel on concept			X		
Discuss concept with UNEF			X		
Site survey in Sinai			X		
Refine Sinai Mission concept and planning schedule				X	
Complete Sinai Mission budget				X	
Complete Operating Instructions					X
Introduce the Mission Chief to Egypt, Israel, UNEF and make final coordination					X
Deploy advance party and con- struction teams					X
Deploy the Mission					


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U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION

ORGANIZATION CHART

(Inter-agency Management Option)




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U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION

ORGANIZATION CHART

(Single Agency Option)



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Tab

II

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November 14, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 313

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

DDI-2311-76

SUBJECT: Establishment of US Sinai Support Mission

The President has reviewed the response to National Security Study Memorandum 230 regarding the establishment of a US Support Mission in the Sinai, pursuant to the US Proposal of September 1, 1975. The President concurs in the first recommendation of the study and has directed that a senior interagency group be established under the auspices of the National Security Council to organize, coordinate and provide overall management for the Mission. The member agencies of the management board will be the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The President also concurs in the third and fourth recommendations of the Study. He has directed that the Mission be headed by a Director, who will receive broad policy guidance and report to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He will be assisted by a small staff in Washington, as well as drawing upon the support of the interagency management board. In the field, the major part of the work will be carried out under private contract with the contractors and their personnel responsible to the Mission Director and his designated representatives. In carrying out his functions, the Director shall hold the additional title of Special Representative of the President.

The President wishes the Sinai Support Mission to be established expeditiously, in order to be in position to carry out effectively its assigned tasks once the Basic Agreement has been fully implemented. Addressees should designate a senior representative to serve on the interagency management board.

Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.

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The President has also directed that there be a comprehensive review of all operations of the Sinai Support Mission one year from the date of this memorandum, with a view to determining the advisability of any changes in the management or organization of the Mission.


Brent Scowcroft

cc: Office of Management and Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON

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UNITED STATES SINAI SUPPORT MISSION

January 12, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: INR - MR. SAUNDERS
FROM : CLAY McMANAWAY *M*
Subject : Intelligence Support for the Sinai
Field Mission

Since our meeting of January 5, during which we broached the subject, Sinai Field Mission planning has progressed to the point where we can now specify the intelligence support required. Our prime concern is, of course, the safety and welfare of the U.S. civilians in the Sinai.

The Director, Sinai Field Mission, Nick Thorne must be kept aware of the Mid-East developments, not only with respect to Egypt and Israel, but other nations and organizations active in the Mid-East as well. For example, the level and type of terrorist activity is important. Although highly unpredictable, terrorist activity could well become of daily concern to the Mission, necessitating security precautions beyond those currently envisioned. Additionally, the Mission should be apprised of key United Nations deliberations. The Director will, in his normal course of duties, be in contact with UNEF officials. He should be aware of any actions that might affect UNEF and Mission relationships.

We have not incorporated intelligence officer billets into either the Field Mission or the Headquarters Staff. There is some political rationale for not doing so (i.e., to avoid an intelligence connotation to the overall mission), but, in the main, we desire to minimize the need for the Field Mission to receive, store, and analyze the many intelligence reports issued by CONUS and overseas intelligence organizations. We would caveat this last statement to the degree that certain Alerts, or DEFCON's related to the Mid-East probably should be routed directly to the

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Field Mission by the issuing organization.

Although the precise format, periodicity, and content will need to be worked out, our minimum requirement is for a 24-hour INTSUM which would contain the following:

- A. General highlights of Mid-East activity
- B. Status of Israeli and Egyptian forces
- C. Status of Israeli and other forces (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, etc.)
- D. Key Israeli-Egyptian personages actions/statements
- E. Terrorist activity
- F. United Nations deliberations/actions

The information should be drawn from all-source intelligence, but sanitized to the Top Secret level.

Brief discussions with [] NIO for the Middle East, indicate that OCI (Office of Current Intelligence) may well be able to provide this support. We have not approached them formally. It is only mentioned in the interest that you may wish to consider OCI as an alternative to other sources for this support.

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There is some urgency to completing necessary actions by early February prior to Nick Thorne's permanent departure for the Sinai.

cc:

P - Mr. Sisco
SSM - Interagency Management
Board Members
NSC - Mr. Oakley

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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: State:

SUBJECT: Proposals for Providing Warning to
the Sinai Field Mission

1. The Intelligence Community Staff has addressed the subject of warning procedures which will insure that the Sinai Field Mission will be informed of any activities or events that appear likely to affect the safety of the US personnel assigned to it. Inasmuch as the Department of State has the primary responsibility for forwarding appropriate intelligence (including alert information) to the Mission and the Department of Defense has the responsibility for emergency evacuation of US personnel, we propose that the following general procedures be adopted for proper warning notification.

2. The primary warning mechanism should be the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers' Net (NOIWON) which connects the seven intelligence/operations watch centers in the Washington area (CIA, DIA, NSA, J-3, State, State/INR, and the White House). The State Department would have primary responsibility to insure that the Sinai Field Mission would be advised of any information received

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that related to or directly affected the safety of US personnel. This would include such alerting advisories as a CRITIC, an Alert Memorandum, an NSA SIGINT Alert, a Strategic Warning Notice, a White House Spot Report (WHSR) and a DIA Warning Appraisal. Other information which, in the judgment of individual Community watch officers, would appear to be of sufficient importance to justify advising the Sinai Field Mission should be transmitted directly with an information copy of the advisory to the Department of State. When appropriate--i.e., when it appears that the information should reach the Mission as soon as possible--a NOIWON conference, as outlined in the attached procedures, should be established.

3. Since the Sinai Field Mission will not be on direct distribution for all intelligence information which may affect the safety of its personnel, the Department of State Operations Center would have the responsibility for insuring that all appropriate information, sanitized as necessary, be forwarded to the team.

4. All elements of the Intelligence Community should be apprised of the State Department's warning responsibility and establish proper procedures to insure no delay occurs in alerting the State Department of possible and probable activities and events that affect the safety of US personnel assigned to the Sinai Field Mission. Likewise, to enable the Intelligence Community to properly support the Mission, it would be useful if the State Department could provide appropriate Community elements with information describing

the functions of the Mission, its staffing, location of the site(s) and the kinds of communications available to it.

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4 February 1976


NOTE FOR: Major Anselmo

Dear Major Anselmo,

Regarding your proposal for providing warning to the Sinai Field Mission, I think the suggestion that NOIWON is the proper vehicle is correct, but in order for those of us outside of State to properly support those people we should be given more background concerning the specific functions this group will perform, the kinds of people located there, their background, the general location of the site and most importantly the kinds of communications available to them.

Other than that, we would have no problem alerting them to possible problems in this area, but lacking that it would seem to us that it would become routine in the extreme unless we had this kind of insight into how they operate.

STATINTL



Vincent J. Heyman
Chief, CIA Operations Center

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